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Abstract
Assurance cases provide an organized and explicit argument for correctness. They can dramatically improve the certifi-
cation of Scientific Computing Software (SCS). Assurance cases have already been effectively used for safety cases for real
time systems. Their advantages for SCS include engaging domain experts, producing only necessary documentation, and
providing evidence that can be verified/replicated. This paper illustrates assurance cases for SCS through the correctness
case for 3dfim+, an existing Medical Imaging Application (MIA) for analyzing activity in the brain. This example was
partly chosen because of recent concerns about the validity of fMRI (Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) studies.
The example justifies the value of assurance cases for SCS, since the existing documentation is shown to have ambi-
guities and omissions, such as an incompletely defined ranking function and missing details on the coordinate system.
A serious concern for 3dfim+ is identified: running the software does not produce any warning about the necessity of
using data that matches the parametric statistical model employed for the correlation calculations. Raising the bar for
SCS in general, and MIA in particular, is both feasible and necessary when software impacts safety, an assurance case
methodology (or an equivalently rigorous confidence building methodology) should be employed.
Keywords: assurance cases, software quality, software requirements specification, scientific computing, medical
imaging software
1. Introduction
Are we currently putting too much trust in the quality
of Scientific Computing Software (SCS)? For instance, for
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), concerns
exist with respect to the statistical analysis models com-
monly employed [28, 9]. Since medical professionals use
the output of fMRI, and other Medical Imaging Appli-
cations (MIA), for diagnosis and treatment planning, we
need to have confidence in the software. Often the devel-
opers of SCS, such as MIA, are medical physicists, scien-
tists and engineers, not software engineers. Although SCS
developers do excellent work, are there currently enough
checks and balances, from a software development per-
spective, for confidence in correctness? The usual ap-
proach employed when correctness is critical is to impose
requirements for official software certification, where the
goal for certification is to: “...systematically determine,
based on the principles of science, engineering and mea-
surement theory, whether a software product satisfies ac-
cepted, well-defined and measurable criteria” [14, p. 12].
Unfortunately, five significant problems exist for SCS in
general, and MIA in particular, in completing a conven-
tional certification exercise through an external body, like
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA):
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1. The external body cannot rely on all their staff hav-
ing deep expertise in the physical problem the soft-
ware simulates or analyses, or in the numerical tech-
niques employed. This tends to lead the external
body to request a large quantity of documentation,
as shown in standards for medical software [5].
2. SCS developers tend to dislike documentation. Sci-
entists do not view rigid, process-heavy approaches,
favourably [3]. Moreover, they often consider reports
for each stage of software development as counter-
productive [30, p. 373]. Although documentation is
generated when required, the normal work flow has
the documentation as a “necessary evil” at the end
of the process.
3. Historically when software engineers work with sci-
entists there are challenges for communication and
collaboration [19, 32].
4. Conventional documentation (requirements, design,
etc.) relies on an implicit argument for correctness;
a tacit assumption is made that completing the doc-
umentation will improve quality, but no explicit ar-
gument is given to show that correctness will be a
consequence of the documentation. Perhaps more
important, there is no explicit recognition that ad-
equate and effective documentation is necessary for
correctness of complex software applications.
5. Verification of SCS is challenging because of the or-
acle problem [20] – testing is difficult because we do
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not always know the expected correct output for a
given set of inputs.
A potential solution to these problems is to have the
SCS developers create, or partially create, an assurance
case before, or while they develop their software. Assur-
ance case techniques have been developed and successfully
applied for real time safety critical systems [29, 31, 50].
An assurance case presents an organized and explicit ar-
gument for correctness (or whatever other software quality
is deemed important) through a series of sub-arguments
and evidence. Putting the argument in the hands of the
experts means that they will work to convince themselves,
along with the regulators. They will use the expertise
that the regulators may not have; they will be engaged.
This engagement will hopefully help bridge the current
chasm between software engineering and scientific com-
puting [19, 46], by motivating scientists toward documen-
tation and correcting the problem of software engineers
failing to meet scientists’ expectations [33]. Significant
documentation will still likely be necessary, but through
assurance cases the developers now decide the content of
the documentation. What is created will be relevant and
necessary. More details on the current literature on assur-
ance cases is given in Section 2.
Arguing in favour of assurance cases for SCS does not
imply that SCS developers have not, or do not currently
treat correctness seriously. They have developed many
successful theories, techniques, testing procedures and re-
view processes. In fact, an assurance case will likely use
much of the same evidence that SCS developers currently
use to convince themselves of the correctness of their soft-
ware. The difference is that the argument will no longer be
ad hoc, or incompletely documented. The argument will
now be explicitly presented for review by third parties;
we will no longer be implicitly asked to trust the devel-
oper. The act of creating the assurance case may also lead
the developer to discover subtle edge cases, which would
not have been noticed with a less rigorous and systematic
approach. This is particularly true when testing is compli-
cated by the lack of a test oracle. The developer needs to
overcome this challenge and their solution to the problem
should be open to external scrutiny.
While the eventual goal is to develop a template for as-
surance cases for any SCS, our initial approach is to learn
by first building an assurance case for one particular ex-
ample. We ask ourselves what an assurance case would
look like for an MIA example, and then assess the poten-
tial value of this assurance case. Our case study focuses
on 3dfim+, an MIA software package that supports Func-
tional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). 3dfim+ was
selected because it is a reasonably small (approximately
1700 lines of code) and easy to understand example of
medical image analysis software. 3dfim+ also has the ad-
vantage that testing is straightforward, because indepen-
dent implementations of the calculations exist that provide
a pseudo-oracle. We targeted medical image analysis soft-
ware, since some of the common fMRI statistical analyses
data have not yet been validated [28] and because a recent
study [9] has shown a potentially serious flaw in software
commonly used to analyze fMRI data. More detail on
3dfim+ can be found in Section 3.
The scope of our work does not include redeveloping
or reimplementing 3dfim+. Our goal is to build an assur-
ance case for the existing software by treating it as black
box. We consider only the executable for 3dfim+ and the
existing documentation. We produce new documentation
and testing results, but not new code. Excluding the code
makes the case study more realistic, since, if an assurance
case exercise were to be conducted in industry, there would
be little appetite for reimplementation. Considerable ef-
fort has already gone into writing medical image analysis
(and other scientific software); it is not feasible for the
community to start over.
To argue for the correctness of 3dfim+, we developed
an assurance case with the top claim of “ Program 3dfim+
delivers correct outputs when used for its intended pur-
pose in its intended environment, and within its assumed
operating assumptions.” Part of the explicit argument in-
volved developing a Software Requirements Specification
(SRS) document that contains all the necessary informa-
tion and mathematical background needed to understand
3dfim+. This document can be used for validation and
verification activities; sections of it appear many times as
evidence in our assurance case. The SRS was reviewed by
a domain expert as part of the assurance case evidence.
We also developed a test case to illustrate how the results
from 3dfim+ can be checked to provide additional evidence
of correctness. An early version of the full assurance case
for 3dfim+ can be found in Nejad 2017 [24, Appendix B].
Excerpts from the full case are given in Section 4. A brief
overview of this work is provided in Smith et al 2018 [42].
Besides providing a means to illustrate assurance cases
for MIA, the 3dfim+ example provides an opportunity to
justify the value of assurance cases for certification. Al-
though no errors were found in the output of the existing
software, the rigour of the proposed approach did lead to
discovering ambiguities and omissions in the existing doc-
umentation. Moreover, the assurance case highlighted a
potential safety concern when running the software itself.
Most importantly, the explicit arguments and artifacts in-
cluded in the assurance case provide evidence that can
be independently judged for sufficiency. The specific evi-
dence for the validation of assurance cases for MIA is given
in Section 5, while the generalization of the approach for
other SCS applications is presented in Section 6.
2. Overview of Assurance Cases
An assurance case is “[a] documented body of evidence
that provides a convincing and valid argument that a spec-
ified set of critical claims about a system’s properties are
adequately justified for a given application in a given en-
vironment” [29, p. 5].
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The idea of assurance cases (or safety cases) began af-
ter a number of serious accidents, starting with the Wind-
scale Nuclear Accident in the late 1950s. This incident
was the United Kingdom’s most serious nuclear power ac-
cident [26] and was instrumental in the government setting
up new safety regulations incorporating assurance cases.
Although there had not previously been an ignorance of
safety concerns, and safety standards and regulatory ap-
proaches had been applied as the norm, the previous ap-
proaches proved to be insufficient. They lacked interaction
between regulators and developers, especially since the de-
velopers were often more knowledgeable than the regula-
tors about the safety of their products. Assurance cases
(safety cases) do not just focus on verifying and validating
the parts, but also on the interaction between the parts
that may cause something unexpected to emerge.
Assurance cases have been widely used in the Euro-
pean safety community for over 20 years to ensure sys-
tem safety [21]. They have been applied in industries
such as aerospace, transportation, nuclear power, and de-
fence [1]. Other examples include the energy sector, avia-
tion infrastructure, aerospace vehicles, railways, automo-
biles, and medical devices, such as pacemakers, and infu-
sion pumps [29]. Attempts have also been made to develop
assurance cases in the security sectors [51].
In North America, the medical domain is showing an
increased interest in assurance cases. Safety cases are con-
sidered to have “the potential to support healthcare orga-
nizations in the implementation of structured and trans-
parent systems for patient safety management” [6]. This
potential is reflected in the Food and Drug Administra-
tion’s (FDA’s) strong recommendation that manufactur-
ers submit a safety assurance case for any new infusion
pumps [47].
Safety cases, and in general assurance cases, require a
clearly articulated argument, supported by evidence. An
assurance case consists of a claim that we make about the
properties of a product, that is then supported by sub-
claims that are eventually grounded in evidence derived
from the product itself and its development.
For our work we have chosen the popular Goal Struc-
turing Notation (GSN), developed by Kelly [22] to make
our arguments clear, easy to read and, hence, easy to
challenge. To develop the assurance case, we used Astah
(http://astah.net/) to create and edit our GSN assur-
ance cases. GSN starts with a Top Goal (Claim) that
is then decomposed into Sub-Goals, and terminal Sub-
Goals are supported by Solutions (Evidence). Strategies
describe the rationale for decomposing a Goal or Sub-Goal
into more detailed Sub-Goals. There are other constructs
in GSN; a full overview, with examples, can be found in
Sprigg’s book [44]. Figure 1 shows what an assurance case
might look like, using Goal Structuring Notation (GSN)
for goals, context and assumptions.
Focusing on the assurance case from the start of a
project can improve the efficiency of the development pro-
cess. SCS, such as MIA, is often subject to standardization
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Fig. 1 Assurance Case with its basic elements 
 
An Assurance Case presents an argument that a system is acceptably safe, secure, reliable, etc. in a given context. 
Where, a system could be physical or a combination of hardware and software. Based on the system goals identified in 
an Assurance Case, Assurance Case can also be referred as security case, dependability case, and safety case or by 
other relevant name as per goals applicability.  
For better clarity, uses, critical engineering decisions and to ensure consistency, it is required to meet some 
minimum requirements for the contents and structure of an Assurance Case. These minimum requirements are specified 
by an International Standard ISO/IEC 15026-2:2011. To present an Assurance Case in a way to make it easy for 
visualization, understanding and reviewing purpose, following Graphical notation tools are used 
 
x Goal Structuring Notation (GSN)  and 
x Claims-Arguments-Evidence (CAE)  
 
CAE defines nodes for Claims, Arguments and Evidence whereas GSN uses goal oriented presentation style and 
defines nodes for Goals (claims), Strategy (arguments) and Solutions (evidence). Both these graphics notations are 
mostly similar, with some difference of progression approach. GSN follows Top –Down approach while creating the 
Assurance Case starting with top level goal of the system where as CAE supports Bottom-UP view starting with 
evidence to determine the possible claim, while preparing Assurance Case [10]. There is no thumb rule as such to 
decide which approach should be followed, it can be decided by developers based on their choice and information 
available in hand before proceeding ahead with creating of Assurance Case. Arguments presented using GSN can help 
provide assurance of critical properties of systems, services or organizations (such as safety or security properties). 
Such arguments can form a key part of an overall assurance Case [11].   Refer figure 1, which is showing the typical 
structure of an Assurance Case represented with Goal Structuring Notations. 
 
Assurance Case in its simple form basically consists of following main components.  
 
x Claim or Goal: This is generally some functionality, characteristics, requirement or behavior of the system 
that needs to be fulfilled. This can include all the essential requirements, functionalities and behavior of the 
system which is supposed to be met to ensure that system is fit for use. All the goals/claims are required to 
be supported by valid arguments based on valid evidences.   The higher level goal/claim can be further 
Figure 1: A basic GSN structure [11]
and regul tory pproval. While applying such approvals
and standards has had a beneficial effect on system qual-
ity, it does not provide good tracki g of the development
stages, as the compliance with the standards are mostly
checked after the system development. Once a system is
implemented, its documentations must be approved by the
regulators. This process is lengthy and expensive. In co -
trast, assurance case development should progress at least
in parallel with the sys em construction (as recommended
by the FDA [47]), resulting in a traceable, detailed argu-
ment for the desired property (or properties). Mor over,
assurance cases take a more direct, flexible and explicit
approach. They are flexible enough to incorporate all ex-
isting assurance activities and artifacts in any step of the
procedure. With the aid of a template and with experi-
ence, we believe that developing an assurance case does
not necessarily require as much additional effort as people
fear, and it potentially reduces costs, saves time and gives
greater freedom in accommodating different standards.
3. Overview of 3dfim+
3dfim+ [49] is a tool in the Analysis of Functional
NeuroImages (AFNI) package (https://afni.nimh.nih.
gov/). 3dfim+ analyzes the activity of the brain by com-
puting the correlation between an ideal signal and the mea-
sured brain signal. The ideal signal is defined by the user.
For instance, the ideal signal could be a square wave, as
shown in Figure 2. For ease of comparison, the correspond-
ing value of the measured activity in Figure 2 is scaled be-
tween 0 and 1. This figures shows high correlation between
ideal and measured signals.
Figure 2 shows the ideal signal versus the brain activ-
ity for one voxel in the full 3D image of the brain. This
analysis is completed for every voxel. The results can be
visualized using the tools in the AFNI. Figure 3 shows the
AFNI environment, in which we can see the brain from
different perspectives with areas of high (negative and pos-
itive) correlation highlighted.
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Figure 2: Ideal signal versus activity of the voxel at position
(23,27,22) over time
Figure 3: AFNI environment and visualizing the active parts
of the brain (from https:// commons.wikimedia.org/ wiki/ File:
AFNI screenshot.png)
As mentioned in Section 2, assurance cases are usually
developed in parallel with the system construction. Given
that 3dfim+ already exists, this was not an option for our
current case study. This means that we had to be partic-
ularly vigilant to avoid problems with confirmation bias.
We did not want to prove correctness of 3dfim+ with a
flawed argument. Since we do not have a vested interest
in the correctness of 3dfim+, this is less likely to be a prob-
lem than it might generally be. Our initial ignorance of
the domain area also helps, since we acquired the domain
knowledge in parallel with constructing the assurance case.
4. Assurance Case for 3dfim+
We have used the guidance provided in “General Prin-
ciples of Software Validation; Final Guidance for Indus-
try and FDA Staff” [4] to develop our assurance case.
This guide outlines generally recognized validation prin-
ciples that are FDA acceptable for the medical software
validation. It was prepared by the International Medi-
cal Device Regulators Forum (IMDRF) to provide globally
harmonized principles concerning medical device software.
The general principles document includes software, like
3dfim+, that is itself considered a medical device.
The presentation of the assurance case starts with an
overview of assurance arguments using GSN. This is fol-
lowed by summaries and excerpts from the evidence used
to support the argument. The evidence includes the Soft-
ware Requirements Specification (SRS), Test Cases, and
Domain Expert Review.
4.1. Assurance Case
Our assurance case consists of many sub-claims, which
means it cannot be represented legibly on a single page.
Therefore, we will only include a representative subset of
the argument, which has been split to separately show the
sub-structures.
We have to label all parts of the assurance case struc-
ture, i.e. all goals, evidence, and contexts, so that our
arguments can be discussed and reviewed unambiguously.
A number of strategies exist to do this [44, p. 32–33]. For
the ease of navigation, we prefer a hierarchical scheme;
top goals in each sub-structure are labeled with a word or
a letter but without a number (for example G) and then
their sub-goals are labeled as G.1, G.2, ... and the subgoals
of G.1 and G.2 are labeled, respectively, as G.1.1, G.1.2,
... and G.2.1 and G.2.2, ... and so on. The evidence is la-
beled in a similar way. Contexts, strategies, evidence and
justifications are labeled alphabetically if more than one
context, strategy or justification is used for an argument;
for example, C Ga, C Gb, C Gc, ... for contexts and S Ga,
S Gb, S Gc for strategies of the Goal G and so on.
When splitting a goal into its sub-goals, the rationale
behind the choice of sub-goals is explained using strate-
gies. In cases where the rationale is straightforward, it is
excluded for space consideration. We have confined our-
selves to traditional GSN, although we believe that GSN
should be augmented to include reasoning, not just a strat-
egy for decomposition. The original intent for assurance
cases was to make the argument explicit. Without the rea-
soning that demonstrates that sub-goals act as premises
for their parent goal, the argument remains implicit.
We have defined our top goal as “Program 3dfim+ de-
livers correct outputs when used for its intended use/purpose
in its intended environment, and within its assumed op-
erating assumptions.” The truth of a claim depends on
its context; therefore, we must be explicit about what we
mean by each term in our goal statement. We could in-
clude the details with the goal statement itself, but then it
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would be too long and would lose its focus. The solution
is to declare the context separately. We have defined each
term in the top goal in several contexts. We have also
made an assumption that the 3dfim+ will only be used
for its intended purpose in its intended environment. The
assumption and contexts are shown in Figure 4.
As previously done for medical device assurance cases [50],
we have divided the top goal into four sub-goals, as shown
in Figure 5. The first sub-goal (GR) argues for the quality
of the documentation of the requirements. To make an
overall argument for correctness, we need a specification
to judge correctness against. The second sub-goal (GI)
says that the implementation complies with the require-
ments and the third sub-goal (GBA) states that, to the
extent possible, the relevant operational assumptions have
been identified. The fourth sub-goal GA also relates to as-
sumptions, claiming that the inputs to 3dfim+ will satisfy
the operational assumptions; we need valid input to make
an argument for the correctness of the output. The strat-
egy section of the GSN diagram presents the reasoning
for decomposing the top-goal in this way: “If the require-
ments correctly and adequately describe the application
to be built, and the implementation faithfully implements
the requirements, then the only possibility that the ap-
plication does not deliver correct outputs is if known or
unknown assumptions are not met. These assumptions
may relate to environmental conditions or usage. We thus
have to consider whether we have adequately defined all
relevant assumptions, and whether those assumptions are
satisfied.”
The top level of the assurance case in Figure 5 does
not imply that up-front requirements are needed. This is
fortunate, since scientists have the view that requirements
are impossible to determine up-front, since they believe
that details can only emerge as the work progresses [3, 34].
The assurance case needs requirements, but they can come
out of the development process in any way appropriate for
the developers. That is, the documentation can be “faked”
like it is part of a rational design process [27].
The main focus in our assurance case is arguing for
GR (quality requirements). The decomposition of GR into
its sub-goals is shown in Figure 6. This decomposition is
based on the IEEE standard 830-1993 [2]. This standard
states that good documentation of requirements should be
correct, unambiguous, complete, consistent, ranked for im-
portance and/or stability, verifiable, modifiable and trace-
able (J GRa). Using the IEEE resource increases confi-
dence in the argument and makes it more compelling. Our
sub-goals address correctness, unambiguity, completeness,
consistency, verifiability, modifiability and traceability of
the requirements documentation. “Ranked for importance
and/or stability” is excluded from the sub-goals in Figure 6
(as shown in J GRb) because our domain is MIA, where
for the software to function properly, all requirements are
considered of equal importance. This is shown as justifi-
cation J GRb in Figure 6.
The arguments for consistency, completeness, and cor-
rectness were combined together in goal G 3C. These qual-
ities were grouped because, according to some publica-
tions, such as “ The Three Cs of Requirements: con-
sistency, completeness, and correctness” [52], there is an
important relationship between completeness, consistency
and correctness for software requirements. Improving one
of these three qualities may diminish the others. From
another perspective, correctness is a combination of con-
sistency and completeness. So it is important to consider
these 3 qualities together. The argument for completeness
is partially based on the argument for the readiness of a
business plan from Spriggs [44, p. 30]. Due to space limi-
tations, the full details of this argument are not included
here. They can be found in [24].
A sample expansion for the sub-goal of modifiability
from GR (Figure 6) is shown in Figure 7. Modifiability is
a quality attribute of the software architecture that relates
to “the cost of change and refers to the ease with which a
software system can accommodate changes” [25]. Modifi-
ability generally requires the requirements documentation
to have a coherent and easy-to-use organization with a
table of contents, an index, and explicit cross-referencing.
Moreover, requirements should not be redundant and they
must be expressed separately. As for the other qualities,
the argument for modifiability makes use of the generic
evidence template (Figure 8) discussed below.
The content of the documentation of the requirements
must be reviewed and verified by domain experts. This
is particularly important in SCS because of the special
role of assumptions. We cannot hope to develop models
that include all of the complexities of the real world, so the
adopted simplifying assumptions need to be judged for ap-
propriateness. Spriggs [44, p. 37] gives a decomposition for
arguments that end with domain expert review. We have
developed a similar decomposition in our template mod-
ules, called GenericEvidence, as shown Figure 8. Gener-
icEvidence is a generic argument. The generic argument
is often called a “pattern”. “A pattern in this context
is an argument that applies to a class of things, which
you can use as the basis of an argument for a specific in-
stance” [44, p. 103]. We have developed this module to
re-use it for several arguments in our assurance case. We
have an argument that a particular quality of the require-
ments documentation has been met; the main evidence
items are the acceptance report and the addressed com-
ments submitted by the reviewers. If we want to ensure
that another quality has been met, we do not want to start
our argument again from scratch. We prefer to use the
same module (sub-structure), but bring in a new evalua-
tion, comments and sections in the report as evidence. In
that case, we can have the name of the quality in the mod-
ule, but publish the argument stating exactly which qual-
ity is reviewed. For instance, for the sake of completeness,
we verified that all statements made in the original doc-
umentation are reflected in the new documentation. This
comparison is mentioned as GenericEvidence.3 in Figure 8.
E GenericEvidence.1 in Figure 8 mentions the accep-
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Figure 4: Contexts and Assumption in Top Goal
tance criteria for reviewers’ resumes. This information is
included in the assurance case to mitigate against the bias
problem mentioned in Section 2. Reviewers need to be
qualified, and we should say what qualified means before
we start looking for a reviewer. When we document the
assurance case, we verify that the experts satisfy these
criteria. If not, we have to make an argument why they
should still be considered experts. This draws attention to
the fact that there is something “unusual” here that may
typically be overlooked.
In Figure 5 we defined GA as “Inputs to 3dfim+ satis-
fies the defined operational assumptions.” Achieving this
goal partially relies on the software to check if the input is
valid, but not all inputs can be validated by the software.
The user of 3dfim+ also has responsibility, in the same
sense that an automobile driver has responsibility to oper-
ate their vehicle safely. This argument for GA is shown in
Figure 9. This argument explicitly states that the user has
responsibility for validating the input. The software can
do automated checks, like verify that the measured activi-
ties are positive, but the software can never tell if 3dfim+
is the right tool for the job. For instance, the statistical
model for 3dfim+ is parametric, if a non-parametric model
would be more appropriate, the user will have to select
another tool. Although not currently part of 3dfim+, we
added a warning message, as part of the assurance case,
that users be explicitly reminded of their responsibilities
while running the software, similar to how movies or video
games with flashing lights warn of the possibility of trig-
gering seizures. Argument GA demonstrates the value of
assurance cases requiring a complete argument. The re-
sponsibility of the user can easily be forgotten without an
explicit coverage requirement to check that no cases are
missing.
4.2. Software Requirements Specification
Having a Software Requirements Specification (SRS)
is critical for software validation [4]. The requirements
6
Figure 5: Top Goal of the assurance case and its sub-goals
mentioned in the assurance case for goal GR (Figure 6)
are documented in the SRS. This document is necessary
to verify software correctness, since it provides a specifi-
cation against which correctness can be judged. As a con-
sequence, the SRS is mentioned in the sub-goals and evi-
dence for several goals. For instance, in Figure 7, for mod-
ifiability, the SRS is mentioned in goal Modifiable.1. Fig-
ure 8 for generic evidence references the SRS in E Generic
Evidence.4, by calling for a requirements acceptance re-
port. Goal GA (Figure 9) for the operational assump-
tions imposes several requirements on the SRS, such as in
E GA.2, which mentions SRS content related to assump-
tions and data constraints.
Due to space limitations, only some representative ex-
cerpts from the SRS for 3dfim+ can be reproduced here.
The excerpts selected are intended to give an overall feel
for the document and to highlight some areas where the
rigour of the assurance case provides benefits for the doc-
umentation and software quality. The full SRS is available
in [24, Appendix A].
4.2.1. SRS Template
Writing an SRS generally starts with a template, which
provides guidelines and rules for documenting the require-
ments. The assurance case supports the need for a tem-
plate through the modifiability goal (Figure 7) Modifi-
able.1.1: “A standard/correct well-structured template has
been followed.” Several existing templates contain sugges-
tions on how to avoid complications and how to achieve
qualities such as verifiability, maintainability and reusabil-
ity [10, 16, 23]. However, no template is universally ac-
cepted. For the MIA example, the choice was a template
specifically designed for scientific software [39, 40], as il-
lustrated via the table of contents shown below. The rec-
ommended template is suitable for science, because of its
hierarchical structure, which decomposes abstract goals to
concrete instance models, through the support of data def-
initions, assumptions and terminology. The document’s
7
Figure 6: GR decomposition
structure facilitates its maintenance and reuse [39], by us-
ing separation of concerns, abstraction and traceability.
1. Reference Material
(a) Table of Units
(b) Table of Notations
(c) Table of Symbols
(d) Abbreviations and Acronyms
2. Introduction
(a) Purpose of Document
(b) Scope of Requirements
(c) Organization of Document
3. General System Description
(a) System Context
(b) User Characteristics
(c) System Constraints
4. Specific System Description
(a) Problem Description
i. Background
ii. Terminology Definition
iii. Coordinate Systems
iv. Physical System Description
v. Goal Statements
(b) Solution Characteristics Specification
i. Assumptions
ii. Theoretical Models
iii. Data Definitions
iv. Instance Models
v. Data Constraints
vi. Properties of a Correct Solution
5. Requirements
(a) Functional Requirements
(b) Non-functional Requirements
6. Other System Issues
7. Traceability Matrix
8. Likely Changes
4.2.2. Goals
The high level objectives of the software are docu-
mented in the goals (Section 4.a.v of the SRS template
shown in Section 4.2.1). A sample goal for 3dfim+ is:
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Figure 8: Generic evidence module used as a pattern in our assurance case
G1: Estimate the Pearson correlation coefficients between
the (best) ideal time series and the fMRI time series
at each voxel over time.
4.2.3. Assumptions
Assumptions (Section 4.b.i of the SRS template) high-
light a simplification made for the purpose of the mathe-
matical modelling. A significant responsibility of the SRS
is to document the assumptions. As mentioned above,
making the assumptions explicit facilitates expert review.
Sample assumptions for 3dfim+ include:
A1: The variables should be either of type interval or
ratio.
A2: There is a linear relationship between the two vari-
ables.
A3: The variables are bivariately normally distributed.
4.2.4. Theoretical Models
The theoretical models are sets of governing equations
or axioms that are used to model the problem described in
the problem definition section (SRS Section 4.b.ii). Trace-
ability exists between the theoretical model and the other
components of the documentation. For instance, the de-
scription for the T1 (Pearson Correlation Coefficient), which
is given below, references the definition for mean (DD1)
and several assumptions, including the three listed above.
Number T1
Label Calculating Pearson Correlation Coef-
ficient
Equation ρ(A,B) =
n∑
i=1
(ai−a¯)(bi−b¯)
[
n∑
i=1
(ai−a¯)2
n∑
i=1
(bi−b¯)2]
1
2
Description The equation calculates Pearson correlation
coefficients ρ applied to two datasets A : Rn
and B : Rn both of size n. a¯ and b¯ are sam-
ple means (DD1) of A and B, respectively.
ρ is the Pearson correlation coefficient be-
tween A and B. Assumptions A1–A5 must
hold when calculating this correlation.
4.2.5. Coordinate Convention
Section 4.a.iii of the SRS documents describes the co-
ordinate system for the fMRI images. This information
is necessary to make the requirements unambiguous, since
there are several choices for coordinate system for medical
images. As an example, the SRS defines the Anatomical
Coordinate System, which describes the standard anatom-
ical position of a human being using 3 orthogonal planes:
axial/transverse (plane parallel to the ground that sepa-
rates the body into head (superior) and tail (inferior) posi-
tions), coronal/frontal (plane perpendicular to the ground
10
Figure 9: Argument for inputs satisfying the defined operational assumptions
that divides the body into front (anterior) and back (pos-
terior) positions), and sagittal/median (plane that divides
the body into right and left positions. 3dfim+ uses NIfTI
data files (https://nifti.nimh.nih.gov/) that store vox-
els from right to left to create rows, rows from anterior to
posterior to create slices and slices from superior to infe-
rior to create volumes. This information was only partially
provided in the original documentation for 3dfim+.
4.2.6. Rank Function
Calculating the Spearman and Quadrant correlation
coefficients [49] requires the use of the rank function. The
original documentation for 3dfim+ had incomplete doc-
umentation of the rank function. The rank function is
defined in the SRS as a data definition.
The rank of data points is determined by sorting them
in an ascending order and assigning a value according to
their position in the sorted list. If ties exist, the average
of all of the tied positions is calculated as the rank. Math-
ematically, the rank of element a in dataset A is defined
as follows:
rank(a,A) : R× Rn → R
rank(a,A) ≡ avg(indexSet(a, sort(A)))
indexSet(a,B) : R× Rn → set of N
11
indexSet(a,B) ≡ {j : N|j ∈ [1..|B|] ∧Bj = a : j}
sort(A) : Rn → Rn
sort(A) ≡ B : Rn, such that
∀(a : R|a ∈ A : ∃(b : R|b ∈ B : b = a) ∧ count(a,A) =
count(b, B)) ∧ ∀(i : N|i ∈ [1..|A| − 1] : Bi ≤ Bi+1)
count(a,A) : R× Rn → N
count(a,A) : +(x : N|x ∈ A ∧ x = a : 1)
avg(C) : set of N→ R
avg(C) ≡ +(x : N|x ∈ C : x)/|C|
The above equations use the Gries and Schneider no-
tation [13, p. 143] for set building and evaluation of an
operator applied over a set of values. Specifically, the ex-
pression (∗x : X|R : P ) means application of the operator
∗ to the values P for all x of type X for which range R is
true. In the above equations, the ∗ operators ∀, ∃ and +
are used. Using this formal notation, we can ensure that
cases are not left out in the documentation.
4.3. Test Cases
To verify the implementation of 3dfim+, we developed
test cases based on the functional requirements documented
in the SRS. The results of the test cases are used as ev-
idence for goal GI (Figure 5), which argues that the im-
plementation matches the SRS. Since our case study is
for SCS, verification through testing is challenging. The
source of the challenge is that SCS differs from most other
software because the quantities of interest are continuous,
as opposed to discrete. As shown for the calculation of the
Pearson correlation coefficient (Section 4.2.4), the inputs
and outputs are continuously valued real variables. Val-
idating the requirements is difficult because there are an
infinite number of potential input values, many of which
cannot be represented as floating point numbers. In gen-
eral for SCS, the correct value for the output variable is
unknown. That is, SCS problems typically lack a test or-
acle [20]. Fortunately for this MIA example, 3dfim+, the
correlation calculations are based on finite sets of real num-
bers, so constructing a pseudo oracle using Matlab was
relatively straightforward.
We developed one Matlab test case per each functional
requirement, to compare their results with the results of
3dfim+. As an example, we had a test case to check the
correctness of the Pearson correlation coefficient, which is
one of the main functionalities of 3dfim+. We used our
Matlab pseudo oracle and AFNI to visualize the results
and obtain the indices of voxels. Our input consisted of
180 frames of 64×64×28 images. In this test case, we
found the minimum and the maximum Pearson correlation
coefficients and their locations. For this test and others,
we achieved the same results for both 3dfim+ and our
independently developed Matlab script.
However, the testing was not without its challenges.
Agreement between the Matlab pseudo oracle and 3dfim+
took a considerable amount of time to achieve, because
the coordinate systems conventions for Matlab and AFNI
are different. Since this information was not documented
in the original 3dfim+ manual, we were unaware of this
subtly. The coordinate system description for 3dfim+ was
added to the SRS (as described in Section 4.2.5) after our
struggles with achieving test case agreement.
In the case of 3dfim+ a pseudo oracle was available.
For other MIA and SCS software, other techniques may
be needed for the verification that the implementation
matches the requirements [36]. Where appropriate, use
can be made of the Method of Manufactured Solutions [30]
and metamorphic testing [17]. For testing purposes, the
slower, but guaranteed correct, interval arithmetic [15] can
be used to ensure that calculated answers lie within the
guaranteed bounds. Verification tests can also include
plans for convergence studies. The discretization used
in the numerical algorithm should be decreased (usually
halved) and the change in the solution assessed. Although
not used in the current example, verification can also use
non-testing techniques, such as code walkthroughs, code
inspections, and correctness proofs etc. [12, 48].
4.4. Domain Expert Review
An important piece of evidence for an assurance case is
the domain expert review. Review of the SRS is important
to reach a common understanding between the software
engineers and scientists. As mentioned in the introduction
(Section 1), building an assurance case facilitates bridging
the gap between software engineers and scientists. The do-
main expert also addresses the oracle problem outlined in
the introduction. Since the correct answer is not known in
general, an expert is needed to determine whether the test-
ing and other evidence is sufficient for building sufficient
confidence in the software.
Domain expert review appears in our assurance case
as “Domain experts/customers approve the <quality> of
the documentation of the requirements.” This corresponds
to GenericEvidence.2.3 in Figure 8. To ensure our SRS
is of high quality, a task-based inspection approach was
used [18, 22]. For the review process we assigned a set
of tasks asking questions about each section of the SRS.
We used Github (https://github.com/) issue tracking
for assigning the tasks and for discussion. Two sample
review questions are reproduced below.
Q7: Please let us know if all symbols in Theoretical Model
T1 (from Section 4.2.4) are defined. Is enough infor-
mation provided that you could calculate the Pear-
son correlation coefficient if you are given datasets
A and B.
Q10: Please let us know if Data Definition DD4 (Rank
Function) (from Section 4.2.6) is explained clearly
or needs any additional information. Please let us
know if the notation we are using for this function is
clear and understandable.
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A domain expert that completed the review for 3dfim+
has a degree in engineering and over 10 years experience
in medical imaging. He therefore meets the acceptance
criteria given in E GenericEvidence.1 in Figure 5. The re-
viewer went through all the assigned tasks and provided
answers/suggestions. For the most part, the SRS did not
need to be modified as a result of the expert review. How-
ever, some of the symbols in the SRS, such as N for the
set of natural numbers, were clarified as a result of the
discussion with the expert reviewer.
The value of expert review is known in SCS. For in-
stance, the High Energy Physics (HEP) software for the
Compact Muon Solenoid (CMS) detector, which is part of
the Large Hadron Collider, has a GitHub pull request pro-
cess that involves automated testing, code quality checks
and code review (http://cms-sw.github.io/PRWorkflow.
html. This example is not unique in SCS. Applying such
best practices contributes to building confidence. How-
ever, the reviews for the CMS software and for other SCS
software are still often ad hoc. Questions like the follow-
ing do not seem to be explicitly answered: What are the
reviewer’s qualifications? What software artifacts (code,
documentation and test cases) are they reviewing? What
issues/concerns are the reviewers checking? A review of
the HEP community roadmap for future software and com-
puting research and development is completely silent on
the idea of formalizing the review process [45]. Informal
reviews are certainly better than no reviews, but formal
reviews have been demonstrated to be more effective. For
instance, systematic code inspections of embedded soft-
ware have a defect removal effectiveness of 85% [8]. As-
surance cases answer the questions listed above; they make
the review requirements rigorous and defendable. More-
over, building an assurance case, like the one for 3dfim+,
shows explicitly that the code is not the only work prod-
uct. The design, test plan, requirements etc., should also
be reviewed. As the domain expert review highlights, the
techniques for building confidence are already employed in
SCS; the shift to using assurance cases just means telling
a more complete and compelling story.
5. Validation of Assurance Case Approach
The 3dfim+ case study provides evidence of the suit-
ability of assurance cases for SCS. Although the original
software was certainly built with care, problems were still
uncovered as a consequence of the systematic and rigorous
process of building a complete and defendable argument
for correctness. The need for documentation, review and
testing not only provides a means to improve the software,
it provides as a byproduct an explicit argument for correct-
ness that can be verified/replicated by third parties.
Before summarizing the assurance case improvements
to 3dfim+, we should note that we are not criticizing the
original 3dfim+ software and its documentation. The goal
of the assurance case is to provide certifiable software,
but the original software did not have this goal. It was
written for researchers, not for clinicians. The users for
3dfim+ and readers of its documentation are likely to be
domain experts. However, even for the existing audience
for 3dfim+, there will likely be some novices. The improve-
ments noted below would likely interest new users, since
the new documentation is more complete and less ambigu-
ous than the original. This benefit of improving software
and its documentation is also observed when retroactively
writing an SRS for nuclear safety analysis software [38].
Given the different audience that was envisioned, the
original documentation would not satisfy the GR goal (Fig-
ure 6) for high quality requirements. The existing doc-
umentation is not fully complete, unambiguous, correct,
consistent, verifiable, modifiable or traceable. One of the
main ambiguities is through the absence of documentation
on the coordinate system (Section 4.2.5). As mentioned
previously, the absence of any specification related to the
coordinate system meant that comparing the 3dfim+ re-
sults to an independent calculation of the correlation was
difficult. Additional investigation was necessary to find
the necessary details so that both results were expressed
in the same coordinate system. Another ambiguity, due
to incomplete documentation, was for the definition of
the rank function (Section 4.2.6). In the original docu-
mentation the specific definition of the rank function is
not given. This creates ambiguity when there are ties
in the data because there are multiple ways to deal with
ties. For instance, all ties could be given the same rank,
and then a gap could be left in the ranking numbers.
Alternatively, ties could get the same rank, but no gap
could be included before listing the next ranking num-
ber. Five different ranking algorithms can be found on
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ranking. The one ac-
tually used by 3dfim+ gives the same ranking number to
all ties, with the rank being equal to the mean of what
they would have under ordinal ranking. This fact was not
determined from the documentation, but by investigating
the C code implementation of 3dfim+. The C code is the
basis for the specification given in Section 4.2.6.
Although the software for 3dfim+ did not show any
errors in its output, some subtle concerns were raised by
considering the assurance case GA for satisfying the opera-
tional assumptions (Figure 9). As shown in GA.1, 3dfim+
should not proceed if the input does not match the neces-
sary assumptions. However, the actual software does not
check the input data. GA.2 (“User is aware of what inputs
are valid”) is also not considered for 3dfim+. The input
assumptions are not made explicit in the documentation
and the user is not warned that it is their responsibility to
provide valid data. As mentioned previously, the user has
the responsibility of determining whether the statistical
model used by 3dfim+ provides the right tool for them.
The need for an explicit warning highlights a significant
benefit of the assurance case methodology - building an
assurance case forces the developers to ask questions that
they might not otherwise ask. We would likely not have
addressed “how does a user know the inputs are valid?” if
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the methodology had not forced us to build an argument
that the inputs satisfy the defined operational assumptions
(Figure 9).
Further evidence for the validity of applying assurance
cases to SCS is the success they have found for real time
safety critical systems [29, 31, 50]. From the perspective of
assurance cases, SCS and real-time systems are not that
different. Both domains require the qualities of correct-
ness and reliability. For qualities where specific examples
may differ in importance, such as the quality of portabil-
ity, the general approach of building an assurance case is
the same, no matter the quality. The specific differences
for different qualities will be in terms of the arguments
and the evidence, not in the overall approach. In terms of
the relationship between developers, domain experts and
regulators, the motivating argument described at the be-
ginning of this paper will usually apply equally to SCS and
real time software. That is, in both cases, the regulators
will likely have less expert knowledge than the developers,
which implies that the case for building an argument for
quality should be in the hands of the developers. If as-
surance cases are suitable for real-time systems, then they
are at least as suitable for SCS, since SCS is arguably sim-
pler than real-time software. SCS does not generally have
the same complexities in the external environment, nor
the same number of hazards, or concerns with emergent
behaviour from the interaction of multiple systems.
6. Generalization of Approach and Future Work
Our example has focused on MIA, specifically 3dfim+,
but generalizing the assurance case approach to other SCS
applications is straightforward. Most of the developed as-
surance case is not medical imaging specific, as illustrated
by the following points:
• The top level goal (Figure 5) can be viewed as generic
if it is parameterized by the software name. That is,
the name 3dfim+ could be replaced with any other
SCS software application and the argument at this
level would be unchanged. This is not surprising as
this top level itself was borrowed from an assurance
case for medical devices [50].
• The context and assumptions for the top goal (Fig-
ure 4) would change for different SCS applications,
but the type of questions to answer for the context
would be similar, such as “what is the intended func-
tionality of the software?”, “what is the intended
software environment?” etc.
• The argument for the required qualities of the re-
quirements is based on the IEEE standard, which
allows decomposition of the quality concerns into ar-
guments for correctness, completeness, consistency,
unambiguity, verifiability, modifiability and trace-
ability (Figure 6). The IEEE standard is intended
to apply to all software, not just medical imaging, or
SCS.
• The arguments for modifiability, generic evidence
and operational assumptions (Figures 7, 8 and 9,
respectively) could be used as a starting point for
other examples. The main difference will be in the
required evidence.
• The SRS template adopted for the requirements is
not specific to MIA; it was developed for SCS in
general and has been applied to cases such as ther-
mal analysis of a nuclear fuel pin [38], mesh genera-
tion [43], and others [37].
The need for building confidence in scientific software
is not unique to medical imaging analysis software, there
are many cases where we need assurance, such as for nu-
clear safety, computational medicine, climate modelling,
etc. The verification of other scientific software, that pro-
vides the evidence at the bottom of the assurance case,
will likely vary from one problem to the next. However,
the tools and techniques for verification on scientific soft-
ware already exist; they do not need to be invented. What
is needed is a push to the scientific software developers to
use the existing techniques and document their results so
that others can build confidence in the software. An ex-
pectation of supplying an assurance case could provide this
push.
Based on the current work and our review of past work
on assurance cases, we have identified a number of direc-
tions for the future development of assurance cases, as fol-
lows:
• Additional Examples to Create a Template: As men-
tioned above, there are significant commonalities be-
tween SCS problems and predictable variabilities.
Recording this information would make the creation
of new assurance cases easier. Since testing was rel-
atively easy for 3dfim+, further exploration will be
necessary for testing options, like the strategies men-
tioned in Section 4.3.
• Build an Assurance Case for a Family of SCS Pro-
grams: Implicit in the previous discussion is that
we have a single SCS program to build an assurance
case, but in many situations, we are interested in a
family of related SCS programs [41], such as a fam-
ily of linear solvers or ODE solvers. In this case,
we would investigate whether we should build an as-
surance case for the family, or a family of assurance
cases?
• Work on the Assurance Case from the Start: The
current work produced the assurance case, SRS and
test plan a posteriori. As mentioned in Section 2, as-
surance cases work best when they are used from the
start of a project. A particular benefit for research
purposes will be a likely increase in the workload
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that can be assigned to domain reviewers, since they
will likely have a greater vested interest in the suc-
cess of the project than when it is a purely academic
exercise.
• Tool Support Improvement: Currently, there is no
tool that provides an abstraction of goals and sub-
goals to handle the complexity of the assurance case
structure. For instance, it would be nice to hide the
details of a goal (or a context, justification, evidence
or assumption) and only show the title. This would
improve readability. Details could be revealed via
clicking on the goals, or context etc.
• Publishing Examples of Practical Assurance Cases:
Currently, many existing assurance cases are not re-
leased due to proprietary rights. The more presenta-
tions on adoption of assurance cases and case studies,
the better resources we have to learn about assurance
cases.
• Adding Formality to Assurance Cases: The means of
expressing confidence in assurance cases and the top-
level claims may benefit from further formality and
rigour, as presented in [7]. Adding formality could
justify the completeness and consistency of claim de-
composition and the credibility of the evidence. A
formal model will help, even if not all evidence will
be mathematical. The formal model will show the
ideal situation and will clarify all of the requirements
for a complete assurance case, even if some of the ev-
idence itself has to be informal.
7. Concluding Remarks
This work has motivated assurance cases for SCS. As-
surance cases have already been effectively used for safety
cases for real time systems. For SCS their advantages in-
clude engaging domain experts, producing only necessary
documentation, and providing evidence that can poten-
tially be verified/replicated by a third party. The engage-
ment of the domain experts is noteworthy because scientist
end user developers have historically shown a distrust of
software engineering techniques and principles. In particu-
lar, SCS developers tend not to favour full documentation
of requirements. However, their motivation should im-
prove because an assurance case shows the necessity and
value of an SRS. As more examples and tools become avail-
able, adoption of assurance cases in SCS in general, and for
the specific example of MIA, should become more preva-
lent. The FDA already strongly advises assurance cases
for newly developed infusion pumps [47].
How to document an assurance case for SCS was illus-
trated via the MIA example of the medical image analysis
software, 3dfim+. The 3dfim+ software analyzes activ-
ity in the brain by computing the correlation between the
measured and an ideal brain signal. This example was
partly chosen because of recent concerns about the va-
lidity of fMRI (Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging)
studies. The concerns centre around whether a parametric
model is appropriate for fMRI data. Although the soft-
ware itself cannot determine whether it is the appropriate
model, the user should ask themselves this question. The
assurance case highlighted how the user can be informed
of the mathematical assumptions of the model through
the SRS, and the details of their responsibility through
in-program warnings.
The value of assurance cases for MIA was justified. Al-
though no errors were found in the software outputs from
3dfim+, the exercise did highlight problems with the orig-
inal documentation and software. The existing documen-
tation was shown to have ambiguities and omissions, such
as an incompletely defined ranking function and missing
details on the coordinate system convention adopted. In
addition, a potential concern for the software itself was
identified. As mentioned above, running the software does
not produce any warning about the obligation of the user
to provide data that matches the parametric statistical
model employed for the correlation calculations. Further
evidence for the validity of applying assurance cases to
SCS is the success they have found for real time safety
critical systems. From the perspective of assurance cases,
SCS and real-time systems have much in common, with
SCS generally having the advantage of a operating within
a simpler environment.
Our example has focused on MIA, but generalizing
the assurance case approach to other SCS applications
is straightforward. Each of the assurance case diagrams
shown had mostly generic content. The main place where
the examples become specific are at the bottom of the ar-
gument, where the evidence is presented. Although the
evidence will be problem specific, the type of evidence
needed, like test reports, domain expert resumes, etc, will
be similar between problems.
Although a concerted effort was made to make the as-
surance case for 3dfim+ convincing and complete, the spe-
cific argument for 3dfim+ is not the point of this paper.
The important revelation about assurance cases is that
they are for communication, between experts, especially
experts in different domains. They make what was previ-
ously implicit, explicit. They force developers to ask ques-
tions that they might not otherwise ask. Is the evidence
complete? Do we have an explicit argument that nothing
important has been missed? Much of the needed evidence
(test cases, expert reviews, etc) for an assurance case, with
the usual exception of requirements documentation, is al-
ready produced when developing SCS. The evidence is gen-
erally presented in an ad hoc way. With assurance cases,
a third party does not have to use incomplete evidence to
form an opinion on the quality of a given work, they can
use the full story, and judge whether the story is convinc-
ing. If a reviewer disagrees, they can point to the portion
of the argument that they feel is weak, and the developers
will have an opportunity to strengthen their argument.
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The developed assurance case relies on the presence of
requirements documentation. However, many in the SCS
community believe that upfront requirements are impos-
sible, or at least infeasible [35]. As a consequence of this
view, requirements are rarely explicitly recorded for SCS.
Can a convincing assurance case for correctness be pro-
duced without requirements documentation as part of the
evidence? We do not believe so, since verification exercises,
like testing, require an explicit objective against which the
results can be judged. However, we leave the challenge
of producing a requirements document free assurance case
open to the SCS community.
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